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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between economic cycle and capital
buffers held by banks in Brazil; the monetary policy impact on the capital
buffers; the effects of such capitalization on the bank lending growth; and
how these effects vary among banks with different ownership structure. We
use an unbalanced panel data of Brazilian institutions from 2001 to 2009
to estimate an equation for the behaviour of capital buffers. Our results,
robust and signiﬁcant, reveal that the economic cycle and monetary policy
affect the surplus capital and that capitalization is positively related to loan
growth.
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Resumo
Este artigo analisa a relac ¸˜ ao entre as reservas de capital (buffers de cap-
ital) mantidas pelos bancos no Brasil entre 2001 e 2009 e o ciclo econˆ omico;
oimpactodapol´ ıticamonet´ arianestasreservas; osefeitosdestacapitalizac ¸˜ ao
no crescimento dos empr´ estimos banc´ arios; e como esses efeitos variam
entre bancos com diferente controle acion´ ario. Estimando uma equac ¸˜ ao
para o comportamento dos buffers de capital, conlu´ ımos que tanto o ciclo
econˆ omico como a pol´ ıtica monet´ aria afetam o excesso de capital e que esta
capitalizac ¸˜ ao est´ a relacionada com o crescimento dos empr´ estimos.
Palavras-chave: buffers de capital, ciclo econˆ omico, pr´ o-ciclicidade,
Basil´ eia II
´ Area ANPEC:7 - Microeconomia, m´ etodos quantitativos e ﬁnanc ¸as
11 Introduction
Banking is certainly one of the most regulated industries in the world, and the
rules on bank capital are one of the most relevant aspects of such regulation. In
general, bank regulation is justiﬁed on the basis of the preservation of ﬁnancial
stability, the presence of market failures and the inability of depositors to monitor
banks (Santos, 2000).
Both the 1988 Basel Accord and the proposal for a new capital adequacy (the
Basel II Accord), in particular the issue of ”pro-cyclicality,” has been subject of
much investigation (see, among others, Kashyap and Stein (2004), Heid (2007),
Jackson (1999), Santos (2000), Borio et al. (2001)). As is well known, by linking
capital requirements more closely to risks, hence more closely to economic con-
ditions, the Basel II rules increase the pro-cyclical nature of banks’ lending be-
haviour. These studies have focused primarily on the effects of the Basel II frame-
work on the cyclicality of the capital charges and making proposals to dampen this
pattern (Gordy and Howels, 2004; Estrella, 2004; Pederzoli and Torricelli, 2005).
Another important branch of the literature on bank regulation focuses on how
bank capital ratios affect the response of lending activity to monetary policy and
GDP shocks (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Furﬁne, 2001; Kishan and Opiela,
2000;HancockandWilcox,1994;denHeuvel,2001;Altunbasetal.,2002;Ehrmann
et al., 2003). These studies, for instance, show that regulatory tightening of cap-
ital ratios can generate aggregate shocks and, therefore, that prudential capital
requirements can inﬂuence macroeconomic outcomes.
In order to assess the effects of bank regulation on the economy, more broadly
speaking, we analyze (1) the relationship between economic cycle and capital
buffers held by banks in Brazil; (2) the monetary policy impact on the capital
buffers; and (3) the effects of such capitalization on the bank lending growth.
In addition, we test whether these effects and the amount of capital buffers vary
among banks with different ownership structure.
WeuseanunbalancedquarterlypaneldataofBrazilianinstitutionsfrom2001:1
to 2009:3 and we estimate an equation for capital buffer controlling for other de-
terminants, besides an economic cycle variable. We ﬁnd a robust and signiﬁcant
negative relationship between capital and the economy. This result raises some
concerns about the pro-cyclicality problem, especially in the debate about the im-
plementation of Basel II accord in Brazil.
Another important ﬁnding is with respect to the monetary policy effects on
capital buffers and the consequent impact on bank lending. We ﬁnd a robust re-
lationship between capital buffers and changes in monetary policy, which in turn
affects loan variation. Since capital buffers has a positive impact in lending ac-
tivity, one may conclude that our results suggest the existence of a ”bank capital
channel” in the transmission of the monetary policy effects.
2It is important to highlight that most of the banks, according to their balance
sheets, hold capital ratio above the required minimum. In this context, the re-
cent research in this area has focused on analyzing the cyclical behavior of capital
buffers. Ayuso et al. (2004) examine the Spanish banks, Lindquist (2004) Nor-
wegian banks, and Stolz and Wedow (2005) German banks, ﬁnding evidence of
a negative relation between the cycle and the buffer. Using an international bank
database, Jokipii and Milne (2008) ﬁnd a similar negative relation for the 15 coun-
tries of the European Union in 2004, but an opposite relation for the 10 countries
that joined European Union in 2004.
Therefore, our paper contributes to the literature on bank pro-cyclicality pro-
viding recent empirical evidence about the cyclical behaviour of capital buffers in
Brazil and how they vary among banks with different ownership structure. Fur-
thermore, our ﬁnding about the effects of monetary policy on capital buffers, on
lending growth and the relationship between these variables show that in fact bank
capitalization has an important role in the mechanism through which a monetary
tightening affects credit activity. To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst
paper in this literature that takes into account explicitly the impact of monetary
policy on the capital buffers held by banks as well as that studies exclusively an
emerging market case.
The banking system in Brazil is basically composed of domestic institutions
(55.7%) and domestic with foreign ownership (34.2%). Public banks account
for less than 8% of total assets1. In addition, it is worth noting that Brazil does
not have a well developed corporate bond market and the stock market has been
growing fast in the last decade. Due to this fact most ﬁrms rely on bank ﬁnancing
and internal sources of funding. Therefore, evaluating the banking system and the
capital movement along the economic cycle is crucial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the moti-
vations for this study: the reasons why banks hold an excess of capital; a brief re-
view about the link between capital and lending activity; and the general ideas be-
hind the pro-cyclicality of capital buffers. The theoretical framework and method-
ology about capital buffers are described in section 4, as well as the dataset used
in equations. The model for lending growth is explained in section 5. Section 6
shows the econometric results. Finally, section 7 presents our conclusion.
1Financial Stability Report of Central Bank of Brazil - May, 2010
32 Motivation
2.1 Reasons why banks hold excess capital
Banks maintain excess of capital primarily because of market discipline, supervi-
sory intervention, and adverse shocks.
Banks may hold capital buffers to avoid costs related to market discipline (for
instance, the cost of deposits) (Lindquist, 2004). When bank liabilities are not
totally insured, the depositors demand higher returns to compensate for higher
bank risk. Therefore, banks may have incentives to reduce its risk and hence the
cost of deposits by increasing its capital level (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2009).
AccordingtoNierandBaumman(2006), theeffectivenessofmarketdiscipline
depends on banks’ support, funding and disclosure. That is, (1) the extent of the
government safety net; (2) The degree to which the bank is ﬁnanced by uninsured
liabilities; (3) The observability of the banks’ risk choice. Thus, the ﬁrst one
reduces capital buffer and the others factors encourage banks to limit their risk of
insolvency (Nier and Baumman, 2006). And this may be achieved by increasing
the amount of capital above the minimum required. Hence banks also may hold
excess of capital to protect themselves against insolvency.
Banksmaykeepcapitalbufferstosignalsoundnesstothemarketandtosatisfy
expectations of rating agencies (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Nier and Baumman,
2006). Hence, excess of capital may serve as an instrument in the competition
for unsecured deposits and money market funding (Lindquist, 2004). Therefore,
banks care about their relative capital buffer.
Banks maintain a cushion of capital as an insurance against violating the min-
imum capital requirement (Stolz and Wedow, 2005; Jokipii and Milne, 2008;
Lindquist, 2004; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2009). When regulatory requirement
changes, banks cannot adjust capital and risk instantaneously. This is because
there are adjustment costs related to raise fresh external capital and the drop in
banks’ common stock values due to changes to equity capital. In addition, this
violation results in costs arising from a supervisory intervention, which may be
(partially) absorbed by excess of capital.
Capitalbuffersalsoactasaninsuranceforthebanksagainstadverseshocks(Nier
and Baumman, 2006). Capital reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy and ﬁnan-
cial distress costs (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2009). In particular for poorly capital-
ized banks, this excess of capital reduces difﬁculties in raising new capital when
capital ratio falls. On the other hand, banks may hold capital to be able to ex-
ploit unexpected investment opportunities. So banks can obtain wholesale funds
quickly (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Lindquist, 2004; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2009).
42.2 Bank capitalization and lending behavior
There are several theories that explain how bank capital could inﬂuence the prop-
agation of economic shocks to lending. All these theories suggest the existence of
marketimperfectionsthatmodifythestandardresultsoftheModiglianiandMiller
(1958) propositions. Speciﬁcally, banksface increasing marginaladjustment costs
as well as they avoid regulatory costs.
Bank capital can inﬂuence the impact of economic shocks on lending in two
ways: the ”bank lending channel” and the ”bank capital channel,” in which we
are more interested. Both of them are based on adverse selection problems that
affect banks’ fund-raising: the ﬁrst relies on imperfections in the market for bank
debt (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; A. K. Kashyap, 1995; Bernanke and Blinder,
1988) and the second concentrates on an imperfect market for bank equity (den
Heuvel, 2001).
The lending channel also relies on another two conditions. First, the banking
sector as a whole must not be able to completely insulate its lending activities
fromshockstoreserves, eitherbyswitchingfromdepositstolessreserve-intensive
forms of ﬁnance or by paring its net holdings of bonds. Second, there must be
some form of imperfect price adjustment that prevents any monetary policy shock
from being neutral (A. K. Kashyap, 1995). Thus, a monetary tightening affects
bank lending because the drop in reservable deposits cannot be completely offset
byissuing non-reservableliabilities(orliquidating someassets). Inthis case, bank
capitalhasanimportantrolebecauseitaffectsbanks’externalratingsandprovides
the investors with a signal about their creditworthiness (Kishan and Opiela, 2000).
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) sum up the three hypotheses on which the
bank capital channel is based: 1) an imperfect market for bank equity; 2) a matu-
rity mismatching between assets and liabilities that exposes banks to interest rate
risk; and 3) a direct inﬂuence of regulatory capital requirements on the supply of
credit. The mechanism is the following. Since the interest rates on banks’ as-
sets are slower to adjust to changes in market interest rates than those on banks’
liabilities, banks bear a loss due to the maturity mismatch between assets and li-
abilities that reduces proﬁts and then capital. If equity is sufﬁciently low and it
is too costly to issue new shares, banks reduce lending, or else they fail to meet
regulatory capital requirements.
Bank capitalization may also inﬂuence the way the loan supply reacts to out-
put shocks if banks’ proﬁts, and thus banks’ capital accumulation, depend on the
business cycle. In this case, output shocks affect banks capacity to lend if the
market for equity is not frictionless and banks have to meet regulatory capital
requirements. Other things being equal, well-capitalized banks are in a better po-
sition, with respect to low-capitalized banks, to absorb output shocks. Since they
hold more capital in excess of the minimum required to meet prudential regulation
5standards, well-capitalized banksxc need to adjust lending less during economic
downturns in order to avoid regulatory capital shortfalls. Thus, if for institutional
reasons banks hold a different amount of capital in excess of regulatory require-
ments, this may in turn imply cross-sectional differences in lending responses to
output shocks (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).
The bank capital channel and the way banks react to output shocks are closely
related to the amount of capital held in excess of regulatory requirements. Gam-
bacorta and Mistrulli (2004) point out that the traditional capital-to-asset ratio
does not discriminate among banks with the same level of capital facing differ-
ent regulatory constraints. By contrast, the capital buffer ratio takes regulatory
requirements directly into account.
2.3 Capital buffers along the economic cycle
There is strong empirical evidence that bank capital buffers under Basel I ex-
hibit signiﬁcant cyclical patterns (Ayuso et al., 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008;
Lindquist, 2004; Stolz and Wedow, 2005). They will increase during economic
downturns and decrease during upturns. One reason for this is obvious: de-
mand for loans is pro-cyclical (Stolz and Wedow, 2005; Gambacorta and Mis-
trulli, 2004).
Since loan losses tend to lag a bussines cycle, this negative movement of
capital buffers may also be evidence for a myopic bank behaviour (Jokipii and
Milne,2008;StolzandWedow,2005;Ayusoetal.,2004;Borioetal.,2001;Berger
and Udell, 2004). Banks expand their loan portfolio in a boom without building
up their capital buffers accordingly. During the following cyclical downturn, the
capital accumulation may also be too slow. Hence, banks’ capital buffers can-
not absorb the materializing credit risks. The banks are forced to increase their
capital buffers through a reduction in lending (Koopman et al., 2005; Stolz and
Wedow, 2005; Jokipii and Milne, 2008).
It is also argued that portfolio risks actually increase during an economic up-
turn (Borio et al., 2001). During booms, borrowers are less likely to default than
during economic downturn. However, banks are likely to take credit risks dur-
ing booms when banks expand their loan portfolios. Hence, forward-looking
banks build up their capital buffers during booms to be able to accommodate
materializing credit risk during recession (i.e. positive movement) (Jokipii and
Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2005).
Considering the cyclicality of lending, the capital buffers are likely to reduce
the impact of changes in capital charges, even partially (Heid, 2007). In this
context, some authors point out that capital buffers will reduce the cyclical effects
of Basel II (Nier and Zicchino, 2005).
Under Basel I, Heid (2007) predicts an increase in the capital buffer during an
6economic downturn due to a reduction in lending. Under Basel II, however, the
capital buffer will actually decrease, because the rise in the average risk weights
will usually overcompensate the reduction in lending (Heid, 2007). Nevertheless,
it is still an open question whether the new accord has necessarily to change the
behaviour of banks regarding the buffers they maintain over requirements (Ayuso
et al., 2004).
Parallel to this approach of bank pro-cyclicality, there is also strong evidence
that well-capitalized banks are less constrained in their responses to monetary
policy and to other macroeconomic shocks compared with banks with relatively
lower levels of capitalization (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Gambacorta and Mis-
trulli, 2004; Nier and Zicchino, 2005; Peek and Rosegren, 1995). In particular,
credit supply of these banks with higher capital ratio are less pro-cyclical.
3 An empirical model for capital buffers
3.1 Determinants of the surplus capital
Following Ayuso et al. (2004), Lindquist (2004), Fonseca and Gonzalez (2009)
we consider three different types of bank capital costs to model capital buffers:
costs of funding, costs of failure (ﬁnancial distress) and adjustment costs.
Holding capital implies direct costs of remunerating the excess of capital, that
is the opportunity cost of the capital. Therefore, banks’ incentives to hold capital
buffers depend on the cost of capital compared to the cost of deposits (Fonseca
and Gonzalez, 2009). Ayuso et al. (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008) use each
institutions’ return on equity (ROE) to proxy these costs. The expected sign for
this variable is negative (Ayuso et al., 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008). As noted
by Jokipii and Milne (2008), ROE may well exceed the remuneration demanded
by shareholders and to this extent is a measure of revenue rather than cost. A high
level of earnings substitutes for capital as a buffer against unexpected shocks.
Thus, as raising capital through the capital markets is costly, retained earnings are
frequently used to increase capital buffers. So the expected sign for ROE may be
negative (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2005), but it also may be
positive (Nier and Baumman, 2006; Stolz and Wedow, 2005; Rime, 2001).
The bank risk proﬁle also determines the capital buffer, since it is related to
the likelihood of costs of failure. Ayuso et al. (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008),
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2009) use the non-performing loan ratio to total loans
and credits (NPL) to proxy the bank risk. It is predicted a negative relationship
between capital buffers and risk.
Banks may face adjustment costs in moving toward their optimal capital ra-
tios. These costs arise both when the bank is raising new external capital and
7when it is shedding external capital (Estrella, 2004). The main entry costs include
those related to the problem of asymmetric information in capital markets. Eq-
uity is a form of capital for which monitoring costs are high, and the bank has
an informational advantage over public investors as to the value of its own eq-
uity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Accordingly, the issuance of equity could be seen
by the potential buyers as a negative signal with regard to the banks’ value. On
the other hand, an important cost of shedding equity comes from pressure from
regulators, supervisors and market participans to maintain clearly sound levels of
capital (Estrella, 2004).
There are several reasons to expect a negative relationship between the banks’
size and its capital level. The main reasons are: diversiﬁcation effect, too-big-
to-fail hypothesis, advantages in the access to capital (Brown and Davis, 2008;
Berger and Udell, 2004), and if there are economies of scale in screening and
monitoring borrowers, then large banks may substitute excess of capital with these
activities (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Lindquist, 2004; Stolz and Wedow, 2005; Nier
and Baumman, 2006).
Finally, it is important to consider the ownership stucture in the modelling of
the buffer. There are some factors to believe that foreign banks hold less capital
buffer than domestic banks, and within these type of banks, public banks hold
less surplus than private institutions. It is because public and private banks decide
in a different manner loan supply. The reason for this is that public banks are
often funding politics executers and also because it is easier for them to raise new
capital. In addition, one may take into account the political inﬂuence factor that
encourages such a banks to sustain credit levels which are not compatible to the
economic rationality and the efﬁcient management. Hence this negatively affects
the amount of excess of capital held by the bank.
3.2 Methodology
We use an unbalanced panel data of 169 banks in 35 quarter periods from 2003:1
to 2009:3. We deﬁne provision as the difference between economic capital and
regulatory capital and capital buffer is this difference divided by the regulatory
capital (in percentage).
3.2.1 Empirical equation for capital buffer
Following previous literature (Ayuso et al., 2004; Stolz and Wedow, 2005; Jokipii
and Milne, 2008; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2009; Brown and Davis, 2008), we apply
the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991). This methodology is specially designed to obtain unbiased and efﬁ-
cient estimates in dynamic models with lagged dependent variables as regressors.
8It also considers the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
The model is
BUFi;t = b0BUFi;t 1 +b1ROEi;t +b2NPLi;t +b3SIZEi;t+ b4OutputGapi;t +
hi+ei;t; i = 1;:::;N t = 1;:::;T
(1)
We deﬁne bank explanatory variables to capture the three types of costs re-
lated to capital buffers. We include the lagged dependent variable to test whether
adjustment costs are relevant. Its expected sign is positive. Direct costs of re-
munerating the excess of capital are proxied by each institutions’ ROE (return on
equity). The expected sign for this variable is negative. Since the expected cost of
failure of each institution depends on its risk proﬁle, we use NLP (non-performing
loans ratio) as a measure of ex post realized risk. It implies that its expected sign
is negative. We include SIZE - the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets - to
capture the effect of the banks’ size on buffer movements. Its predicted sign is
negative.
In order to determine whether the business cycle has an additional effect on
the bank capital buffer, we add OutputGap - obtained after applying a standard
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. We also take into account explicitly the effect of mon-
etary policy in the excess capital by adding in equation 1 the short-term inter-
est rate, the overnight selic interest rate, set by the Monetary Policy Committee
(Copom). Finally hi is an unobserved bank-speciﬁc effect which we eliminate by
taking ﬁrst-differences of all variables. It captures heterogenous characteristics
such as different risk preferences, governance structures, and managerial skills.
The standard random shock is ei;t.
4 Estimating the effects of bank capitalization on
lending behavior
In order to take into account the bank lending activity in the study of the pro-
cyclicality of the capital buffer, we consider the effect of each institutions’ cap-
italization (e.g., the bank capital buffer) on the lending growth. In addition, we
use this approach to analyze the mechanisms by which bank capital affects the ef-
fects of monetary policy in loan growth. As reported by Berrospide and Rochelle
(2008), there are many possible values for the magnitude of this impact. Repre-
senting one extreme is the possibility that banks target a constant leverage ratio
and are very limited in their ability to raise equity to offset declines in capital.
9On the other hand, there is the possibility that a decline in the leverage ratio that
results from a capital loss can be accommodated and that the capital loss can be
offset by alternative sources of funding. In this case, capital losses result in no
contraction of assets or of lending.
We estimate a regression of the growth rate in loans in which we include,
besides the capital buffers, lags of the dependent variable, lags of the economic











In order to analyze whether bank ownership structure and bank capitalization
(capital buffers) affect the impact of monetary policy and of the business cycle
on loan growth, we estimate extensions of equation 6 with the interactions of
the dummy variables, Well(Low)-capitalized, Foreign, Private and Public with
DSelic and OutputGap. Where Well(Low)-capitalized variables are deﬁned in
the following manner: if the bank holds a buffer higher (lower) than the average,
that is equal to 9.282672, then Well(Low)-capitalized takes 1 and O otherwise. On
the other hand, in order to verify whether the conditions of monetary policy and
economic cycle affect the impact of bank capitalization on loan growth we add
in equation 6 the interaction between the dummy variables Up(Down)-Selic, or
Up(Down)-(output gap), and capital buffer. Where Up(Down)-Selic are deﬁned
inthefollowingmanner: ifDSelicisincreasing(decreasing)thenUp(Down)-Selic
takes 1 and 0 otherwise. The same for output gap.
5 Results
5.1 Estimation of the determinants of capital buffer
Tables 1-3 present the results of estimating equation 1 and its extensions. The re-
sults of the baseline model are displayed in columns 2 of tables 1 and 2. We apply
Sargan test and Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions to conﬁrm the absence
of correlation between the instruments and the error term. The non-signiﬁcance
of the m2 test indicates no second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-difference
residuals. These are the conditions required for consistency of the GMM esti-
mates.
10The coefﬁcient on the lagged dependent variable is positive, relevant and
highly signiﬁcant in all cases. This is predicted and reﬂects the fact that banks
face short-term adjustment costs. It is also found that the opportunity cost of cap-
ital, measured by the return on equity (ROE), has a negative effect on the surplus
capital.
Differently from expected, in some models the coefﬁcient on NPL shows a
positive relation between risk and capital buffer. In this case, it may indicate that
higher capital in excess of capital requirements is linked to a higher risk appetite.
In addition, there is evidence of a negative relationship between size and buffer.
Actually, the coefﬁcient is negative and highly signiﬁcant when the dependent
variable is Basel Index (see column 4 of table 3).
Considering the bank ownership structure, we test whether foreign, private do-
mestic and public banks have a different portion of capital buffer. First we include
the dummy variables Foreign and Private. The sign and signiﬁcance of these vari-
ables reveal that foreign banks have a smaller capital buffer than private domestic
banks. This can be seen as evidence that geographically diversiﬁed banks are less
likely to suffer a decline in their capital ratios. There is also evidence that private
banks hold more surplus capital than public banks, although this difference is not
so acute.
There is a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the output
gap and the capital buffers. We test the robustness of these results by trying differ-
ent extensions of equation 1. In all cases, the results support a negative movement
of capital buffers along the economic cycle.
First, we estimate a model in which all the bank-speciﬁc variables were omit-
ted. We also experimented with varying lag lengths for the explanatory variables,
and by dropping ROE and NPL variables at a time from the estimations. Because
of their cyclical behavior, notably NPL, these variables could inﬂuence the sign
and signiﬁcance of OutputGap.
In addition, three new regressors were added to equation 1, namely the ratio
of capital tier 1 to total assets (Tier1), the equity ratio and the volume of deposits
(ln(Deposits)) - the natural logarithm of total deposits. The estimated parame-
ter of OutputGap remains almost unchanged, supporting the robustness of the
results. In particular, the signiﬁcance of the estimated parater of OutputGap in-
creases. The new regressors are not signiﬁcant and their signs are respectively
positive, positive and negative - as it was expected.
We also investigate whether the pro-cyclicality of capital buffer could vary
among banks with different ownership structure. First we interact OutputGap
with the dummy variables Foreign and Private and ﬁnd that capital buffers in
foreign banks are, if anything, less pro-cyclical than in private banks. On the
other hand, the results reveal that capital buffer in public and private banks vary
along the economic cycle in the same manner.
11Table3showstheresultsofestimatingequation1withDSelici;t 1 asregressor.
Thenegativesignonthisvariablecanbeseenasevidencethatmonetarytightening
may lead to a reduction on bank proﬁts, and then on capital. Since capital buffers
are composed in some part by retained earnings, this drop in proﬁts could reduce
the amount of excess capital. In fact, when we estimate equation 1 using Basel
Index as dependent variable, we ﬁnd a positive sign on DSelici;t 1, suggesting that
monetary tightening and economic downturn have different impacts on capital
buffers, although both of them are related with regulatory constraint (see column
4 of table 3). While the sign on the interactions ForeignSelic and PrivateSelic
does not reveal any interesting result, the sign on PublicSelic and PrivateSelic
suggests that the effect of an increase in Selic on banks’ capitalization is more
moderate in public banks.
5.2 Estimation of the lending growth equation
Next, we show the results from estimating equation 2 in table 4. The coefﬁcients
on the three ﬁrst lags of loan growth is negative and the sign of the fourth lag is
positive and signiﬁcant.
ThecoefﬁcientonDSelici;t 1 isnegative, signiﬁcantandrobust. Totestwhether
monetary policy effects are equal among banks with different capital ratios (e.g.,
capital buffers), we add the interaction between Selic and the dummy variables
Well(Low)-capitalized. Inconsistent with the ”bank lending channel” hypothesis,
there is no clear evidence that the effects of monetary tightening are smaller for
banks with higher capital ratios, although they have easier access to uninsured
ﬁnancing. We also test whether the bank ownership structure could inﬂuence the
monetary policy effects. Hence we interact Selic with the dummy variables For-
eign, Private and Public. Interestingly, the results reveal that the loan growth of
foreign banks is more affected by changes in monetary policy than the lending of
private banks. It is valid noting that these coefﬁcients are not statistically signiﬁ-
cant.
As it was predicted, while the parameter of OutputGapi;t is negative and sig-
niﬁcant, the coefﬁcient of OutputGapi;t 1 is positive. In addition to the natural
cyclicality of demand for loans, this can be seen as evidence of the cyclicality of
capital requirements. The signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the interaction between Low-
capitalized and Output gap show that lending growth in low-capitalized banks is
more susceptible than in well-capitalized ones to changes in economic conditions.
It has also found signiﬁcant evidence that the effect of GDP shocks is more pro-
nounced for private banks than for foreign institutions.
The estimates show that capital buffers are positively related to growth in
loans. Francis and Osborne (2009) explain that banks may choose to take this
route in order to avoid the costs of regulatory intervention or adverse market re-
12action. The results also reveal that the capitalization impact on lending is weaker
in economic downturn.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the determinants of bank capital buffers, in particular the rela-
tionshipbetweencapitalandtheeconomiccycle, anditseffectsonlendingactivity
using a panel data of 169 banks in Brazil between 2001 and 2009. We apply the
GMM difference and system estimators to control for adjustment costs, unobserv-
able heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. We
focus primarily on whether the capital buffer depends on the business cycle and
on whether the buffer depends on the banks’ ownership structure. In addition, we
test the effects of bank determinants of the cushion of capital.
Taken together, our results indicate that in economic downturn, banks raise
the amount of capital buffers and lower growth in loans. One may argue that
this raise in excess capital could imply in a higher lending growth, because the
sign on capitalization is positive. In this case, considering the signiﬁcance and
robustness of the results regarding output gap in both equations for buffer and for
loans, one may conclude the effect of the economic downturn overcompensates
the impact of bank capitalization. However, we ﬁnd that this effect is certainly
stronger for low-capitalized banks, since they are more limited to assess external
funding sources.
In economic downturn, banks have in our sample period increased capital
buffers and, under the new accord Pillar 1, capital requirements will be increased
as banks exposures are downgraded, whether by external rating agencies or in in-
ternal rating systems. This suggests that capital management will be especially
challenging under the new accord because it will lead to higher capital require-
ments precisely at the time (the trough of the business cycle) when most of the
banks are seeking to reduce their capital levels.
Anotherimportantconclusionisrelatedtotheimpactofcapitalizationonlend-
ingbehavior. Accordingtoourresults, monetarytighteningisrelatedtoadecrease
in capital buffers and in loan growth. Since capitalization is positively related to
lending variation, these ﬁndings can be seen as evidence of the ”bank capital chan-
nel” in the transmission of monetary policy. Indeed, an increase in Selic interest
rate would imply in a reduction on bank proﬁts, and then on capital buffers. As
the market for equity is imperfect, banks would opt to cut back on loans.
Finally, these results indicate that bank capital is a relevant balance-sheet item
for the propagation of different kinds of shocks to lending, particularly owing to
the existence of regulatory capital constraints. As highlighted by Gambacorta and
Mistrulli (2004), this implies that when evaluating different schemes of regulation
13on bank capital, one has to consider not only microeconomic effects on banks’
soundness but also the macroeconomic consequences of those same schemes.
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16(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Provision Provision Provision Provision Provision Provision Provision Provision Provision
Lagged Provision 0.289*** -0.0305 -0.0329 0.0153 0.265*** 0.0939 0.0225 0.100
(0.0433) (0.0825) (0.0819) (0.0946) (0.0999) (0.119) (0.135) (0.109)
ROE -0.0103 0.00821 0.00880 -0.0414 -0.0590** -0.0159 -0.0151
(0.00941) (0.0308) (0.0304) (0.0313) (0.0288) (0.0275) (0.0301)
NPL 1.070 -3.802 -3.813 -4.483 1.455 -1.646 0.697
(2.238) (4.149) (4.169) (4.492) (3.823) (4.489) (4.172)
Size -2.018 -0.699 -0.683 -1.296 -3.928** 1.087 0.480 -2.886*
(1.421) (1.704) (1.692) (1.760) (1.588) (2.480) (1.623) (1.709)
Output gap -28.47** -12.12* -20.34*** -22.76** -21.61* -17.36 -12.84 -19.16 -16.18
(14.17) (6.269) (7.427) (11.19) (11.26) (11.05) (11.09) (11.86) (11.19)
Private 806.7** 826.6** 845.4** 769.4** 790.0** 722.7*
(348.8) (357.8) (413.2) (344.8) (335.7) (373.5)
Foreign -782.2**
(348.1)
Private*(Output gap) -0.389 -1.261 1.126 -0.588 0.465 -4.797
(9.604) (9.625) (10.17) (9.851) (9.946) (10.08)
Foreign*(Output gap) 6.258 5.236 5.736 3.537 7.564 2.328









Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
m1 -6.64*** -8.34*** -3.7*** -3.72*** -3.68*** -4.69*** -3.30*** -2.68*** -3.58***
m2 -2.17*** 1.49 -1.42 -1.43 -0.94 1 -0.38 -0.8 -0.28
Sargan test 145.21 154.15 153.73 105.67 159.91 134.88 108.95 132.27
p-value 0.142 0.017 0.018 0.110 0.00 0.152 0.590 0.191
Hansen test 129.97 121.55 118.77 96.28 103.72 111.13 109.57 119.79
p-value 0.435 0.418 0.489 0.281 0.19 0.684 0.574 0.463
Observations 3,884 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718
Number of banks 166 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165
Number of Instruments 34 165 157 159 128 131 160 155 160
Table 1: Results of estimating equation 1 and its extensions using Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. Banks operating in Brazil,
2001-2009. The dependent variable is Provision, the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital. In column 1 all the bank speciﬁc variables
are omitted. Column 2 presents the results of the baseline model. In model 3 the dummy variable Foreign is added. In models 4-9, we include the interections
Private(Outputgap) and Foreign(Outputgap). Model 5 excludes ROE and model 6 excludes NPL. Column 7 shows the results of the model with Tier1. In
column 8, EquityRatio and ln(Deposits) are considered. Finally, in model 9 Loans is added. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
17(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES BUF BUF BUF BUF BUF BUF BUF BUF BUF BUF
Lagged BUF 0.750*** 0.574*** 0.574*** 0.571*** 0.568*** 0.558*** 0.539*** 0.552*** 0.499***
(0.0624) (0.0891) (0.0891) (0.0892) (0.0950) (0.0867) (0.0858) (0.0799) (0.0869)
ROE -0.0346 0.0188 0.0188 0.0174 0.0318 0.0230 -0.00162 0.0221
(0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0253) (0.0237) (0.0206) (0.0214)
NPL -2.403 -5.064* -5.064* -5.153* 1.758 1.969 -4.385** 1.086
(2.192) (2.782) (2.782) (2.811) (3.071) (2.777) (2.193) (2.396)
Size 0.0790 0.177* 0.177* 0.180* 0.113 0.0470 0.0789 0.242* 0.154
(0.0912) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.162) (0.133) (0.128) (0.144) (0.148)
Output gap -9.223 -3.184 -5.246 -5.246 -8.763 -6.353 -5.786 -2.248 -8.167 -5.403
(6.870) (4.978) (4.339) (4.339) (5.743) (6.357) (5.932) (4.885) (5.271) (5.530)
Foreign -2.281 -11.42 -19.64 -11.92 -20.75 -16.58
(30.33) (36.10) (39.85) (41.48) (36.42) (41.26)
Private 33.41 35.69 25.96 10.01 5.800 20.78 27.13 13.24
(30.30) (21.59) (36.48) (48.06) (45.89) (27.39) (37.58) (43.04)
Public 2.281 10.58
(30.33) (42.26)
Foreign*(Output gap) 2.410 2.353 1.811 2.984 2.117
(4.603) (4.763) (4.777) (4.685) (4.732)
Private*(Output gap) 2.171 1.437 1.493 -0.399 2.237 1.665









Constant 243.4*** 97.86* 11.08 8.798 31.64 54.88 43.48 9.453 18.18 -68.19
(38.50) (56.92) (72.33) (51.10) (76.83) (95.28) (87.12) (56.58) (96.93) (112.6)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
m1 -5.46*** -5.67*** -5*** -5*** -4.78*** -5*** -4.99*** -5.13*** -5.02*** -5***
m2 -0.5 2.45 2.33 2.33 2.32 2.36 2.43 2.35 2.23 2.38
Sargan test 75.34 87.07 87.07 87.42 78.81 66.95 94.44 103.16 111.45
p-value 0.998 0.568 0.568 0.557 0.3 0.677 0.583 0.736 0.764
Hansen test 85.66 95.93 95.93 96.38 72.23 65.67 100.29 98.74 92.59
p-value 0.978 0.315 0.315 0.304 0.503 0.716 0.417 0.828 0.981
Observations 4,050 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884
Number of banks 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166
Number of Instruments 35 152 130 130 132 114 114 140 156 166
Table 2: Results of estimating equation 1 and its extensions using Arellano and Bond (1991) system GMM estimator. Banks operating in Brazil, 2001-
2009. The dependent variable is capital buffer, the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital divided by regulatory capital (in porcentage). In
column 1 all the bank speciﬁc variables are omitted. Column 2 presents the results of the baseline model. In model 3 the dummy variables Foreign and Private
are added, and in model 4 the dummy variables Public and Private are added. In equations 5-7 and 9-10, the interections between output gap and the dummy
variables Foreign and Private are included, while in equation 8 the interaction between output gap and the dummy variables Public and Private is considered. Model
6 excludes ROE and model 7 excludes NPL. Column 9 shows the results of the model with Tier1. In column 10, Equityratio and Deposits are considered. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
18(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES BUF BUF BUF Basel Index
Lagged BUF -0.043 -0.171 -0.171
(0.105) (0.106) (0.106)
Lagged Basel Index 0.337***
(0.169)
ROE -0.040 0.0204 0.0204 -0.0665
(0.0802) (0.0810) (0.0810) (0.0558)
NPL 0.045 0.0662 0.0662 -0.112*
(0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.0601)
Size -0.301 0.408 0.408 -1.219***
(0.217) (0.194) (0.138) (0.456)
Output gap 0.499 -3.482 -3.482 -5.791
(4.841) (8.628) (8.628) (3.807)
DSelici;t 1 -7.031 -4.513 -6.093 16.08











Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
m1 -4.68*** -3.04*** -3.04*** -4.35***
m2 -0.22 -1.23 -1.23 0.99
Sargan test 145.143 92.38 92.38 102.55
p-value 0.840 0.354 0.354 0.138
Hansen test 121.07 83.02 83.02 94.61
p-value 0.532 0.630 0.630 0.296
Observations 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718
Number of bank 165 165 165 165
Number of Instruments 140 128 128 160
Table 3: Results of estimating equation 1 with the interest rate Selic as regressor. The methodology employed is the
Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. Banks operating in Brazil, 2001-2009. The dependent variable is
capital buffer, the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital divided by regulatory capital (in porcentage).
Column 1 presents the results of the baseline model. In model 2 the interections between Selic and the dummy variables
Foreign and Private are added, as well as in model 3 Selic is interected with dummy variables Public and Private. Column
4 shows the results when the dependent variable is Basel Index. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Dloan Dloan Dloan Dloan Dloan Dloan Dloan Dloan Dloan
DLoani;t 1 -0.144 -0.122 -0.2166 -0.0159 -0.144 -0.142 -0.149* -0.146 -0.145
(0.0892) (0.0899) (0.1072) (0.111) (0.0892) (0.0927) (0.0893) (0.0891) (0.0890)
DLoani;t 2 -0.0243 -0.0144 -0.1463 -0.0775 -0.0233 -0.0219 -0.0319 -0.0232 -0.0263
(0.0967) (0.0962) (0.0972) (0.0918) (0.0966) (0.0983) (0.0973) (0.0960) (0.0973)
DLoani;t 3 -0.0880 -0.0946 -0.2117* 0.00240 -0.090 -0.0833 -0.0843 -0.0873 -0.0875
(0.115) (0.111) (0.1169) (0.0857) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
DLoani;t 4 0.160* 0.169* 0.0113 0.215** 0.161* 0.164* 0.165* 0.164* 0.161*
(0.0896) (0.0882) (0.1165) (0.0972) (0.0896) (0.0891) (0.0898) (0.0886) (0.0892)
DSelici;t 1.365 -0.0156 -8.3744 1.350 3.351 2.184 1.140 1.414 2.184
(4.542) (4.871) (5.2683) (4.541) (12.87) (5.454) (4.679) (4.612) (5.454)
DSelici;t 1 -10.02** -11.46** -9.5164* -18.38*** -10.02** -9.996** -10.18** -10.11** -10.00**
(4.030) (5.314) (5.5689) (4.861) (4.037) (4.055) (4.051) (4.040) (4.035)
DSelici;t 2 -7.496 -5.920 0.6196 -3.312 -7.492 -7.671 -7.506 -7.641 -7.570
(5.767) (4.619) (6.1412) (4.786) (5.762) (5.732) (5.808) (5.757) (5.774)
DSelici;t 3 13.60* 12.25* 4.7809 5.051 13.57* 13.37 13.70* 13.26 13.58
(8.150) (6.925) (7.8765) (5.114) (8.141) (8.219) (8.229) (8.377) (8.211)
DSelici;t 4 -4.921 -10.59** -18.48*** -1.993 -4.958 -4.679 -5.059 -4.935 -4.816
(6.077) (5.293) (6.974) (5.134) (6.093) (6.131) (6.104) (6.195) (6.076)
OutputGapi;t 9.087* 8.926** -14.3914* 24.22*** 9.003* 9.152* 13.51 2.101 9.152*
(4.924) (3.669) (8.7357) (7.823) (4.879) (4.939) (12.26) (6.226) (4.939)
OutputGapi;t 1 -2.117 -7.418 14.57*** -13.88** -2.118 -2.144 -1.927 -2.066 -2.096
(3.845) (9.980) (4.9383) (6.676) (3.849) (3.818) (3.826) (3.825) (3.841)
OutputGapi;t 2 -0.943 2.667 -4.3540 23.49*** -0.924 -0.900 -1.079 -0.842 -0.996
(4.327) (8.443) (5.0087) (6.022) (4.335) (4.384) (4.336) (4.369) (4.344)
OutputGapi;t 3 13.86** 10.93* 22.5017*** -6.841* 13.87** 13.68** 14.00** 13.67** 13.85**
(5.598) (6.519) (7.6171) (4.058) (5.606) (5.599) (5.645) (5.688) (5.637)
OutputGapi;t 4 -5.308 -6.176 -18.04*** 4.996 -5.304 -5.131 -5.504 -5.150 -5.297
(4.819) (6.268) (5.9471) (3.758) (4.816) (5.104) (4.871) (5.044) (4.854)
BUF 0.197 0.0385 0.0886 0.194 0.196 0.201 0.189 0.203 0.201







































Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
m1 -3.94*** -3.92*** -3.91*** -3.74*** -3.93*** -3.89*** -3.92*** -3.95*** -3.96***
m2 -1.32 -1.34 -1.07 0.31 -1.33 -1.29 -1.24 -1.35 -1.29
Sargan test 109.84 112.76 118.57 128.44 109.84 109.69 110.76 109.53 109.96
p-value 0.354 0.285 0.313 0.185 0.354 0.308 0.331 0.331 0.351
Hansen test 111.94 113.04 113.43 104.24 111.43 110.21 112.71 109.76 112.32
p-value 0.304 0.279 0.293 0.754 0.315 0.296 0.286 0.306 0.295
Observations 3,242 3,242 3,242 3,396 3,242 3,242 3,242 3,242 3,242
Number of bank 149 149 149 154 149 149 149 149 149
Number of Instruments 140 142 142 153 142 141 143 141 143
Table 4: Growth in loans. Results of estimating equation 2 using Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. Banks operating in Brazil, 2001-
2009. The dependent variable is the variation in loans. The measure of bank capitalization is capital buffer. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
20